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Theism and Psychological science:  
a call for raPProchemenT
Michael J. Vogel, Tyler A. Gerdin, and Mark R. McMinn*
abstract
The authors offer two arguments for the inclusion of theism in natural science. first, an 
argument against excluding theism is offered. Though early roots of science promoted a 
view that it is a way to accumulate knowledge that is untainted by presuppositions and 
traditions, postmodern critiques call this into question. scientists have sometimes rejected 
religion as a context-dependent, tradition-based way of knowing, yet science itself is also 
context-dependent and tradition-based. second, an argument for including theism in psy-
chological is offered. Theistic beliefs are relevant insofar as they are part of human experi-
ence for many, they represent a form of human diversity, and they have been associated 
with some positive health outcomes.
Keywords: psychological science, theism, philosophy of science, ethics
To the psychologist the religious propensities of [indi-
viduals] must be at least as interesting as any other of 
the facts pertaining to [their] mental constitution. it 
would seem, therefore, as a psychologist, the natural 
thing for me would be to invite you to a descriptive 
survey of those religious propensities. 
—William James (1902/1961, p. 4)
James, the founding figure of american psychological science, was com-
mitted to the study of religion (fancher, 2000). for him, the scientific 
exploration of theism was as interesting as it was necessary for under-
standing the human experience. There was no desire to separate science 
and religion. however, this position began to shift during the 20th century 
as particular philosophical assumptions took root in psychological science 
(miller & Thoresen, 2003). it now seems common to notice shelves full of 
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bestselling books attempting to discredit theistic religion and demanding 
its exclusion from science (e.g., dawkins, 1996, 2006; dennett, 1996, 2006; 
stenger, 2007). The once strong relationship between theism and psy-
chological science is at present on the brink of collapse, and much is at 
stake. 
in what follows, we suggest that the usual grounds for excluding theism 
are insufficient and begin by acknowledging some of the philosophical 
assumptions at the core of this debate. 
The argument against excluding Theism
The earliest justifications for science were predicated on belief in a divine 
being (stark, 2003). it seemed that a divine being had created an ordered, 
intelligible world for humanity to freely explore, and the methods that 
would become central to science made this exploration possible. That a 
theistic worldview created the initial rationale for the scientific endeavor 
renders the present charge to defend the possibility of theism in science 
quite an intriguing paradox. 
although common objections to the inclusion of theism in psycho-
logical science are complex, they often pertain to incompatible ways of 
knowing. owing to the fact that science seems accountable to highly rig-
orous, context-independent standards for knowledge, it has been given 
prerogative over the extra-scientific conclusions of theistic traditions. 
context-independent refers to knowing that is reliable and not limited to 
particular reference points or audiences. We prefer this term to objective 
knowing. context-dependent, on the other hand, refers to knowing that is 
reliable but limited to particular reference points or audiences. We prefer 
this term to subjective knowing. extra-scientific refers to claims that are 
not known through scientific methods; they are situated outside of the 
province of science. 
it seems that many psychological scientists reject the extra-scientific 
claims of theists because they are based on context-dependent and tra-
dition-based ways of knowing. We contend that this view pervades many 
arguments for excluding theism from psychological science, and it has 
important historical and philosophical contexts that warrant some con-
sideration. in the sections to follow, we provide a selected history for the 
philosophy of modern science, some postmodern appraisals of modern 
science, and the conclusion that there are insufficient grounds for exclud-
ing theism from psychological science based on the common objections 
to its inclusion. 
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Early Roots of Science 
Though many individuals contributed to the origins of contemporary sci-
ence, we focus here on two: rené descartes and isaac newton. descartes 
left a most indelible mark on the annals of scientific and philosophical 
inquiry with his leap from radical skepticism to absolute certainty (see 
Toumlin, 1992). his ideas ushered in an era of scientific and philosophi-
cal progress that forever changed the pursuit for knowledge (cf. Buckley, 
1987). newton’s extraordinary ideas about physics and the nature of real-
ity revolutionized the scientific endeavor. The mysteries of the whole 
universe, it seemed, were now subject to the certainties of mathematics 
(newbigin, 1995). 
for the field of psychological science, the cartesian legacy informs a 
number of significant philosophical assumptions regarding the standards 
of claims to knowing, whereas the newtonian legacy influences several 
philosophical assumptions primarily about the nature of reality. These 
have helped to form the usual grounds for excluding theism from psycho-
logical science; they define what science is and what it is not. although a 
comprehensive review of their impact (or that of other influential figures) 
is beyond the scope of this article, we briefly discuss the early roots of four 
such assumptions. 
The Cartesian legacy. descartes (e.g., 1637/2007) influenced psychologi-
cal science in at least two fundamental ways. The first is evident in the 
broad scientific ambition to discover context-independent knowledge (cf. 
newbigin, 1995). This is an extension of the cartesian summons to reject 
the context-dependent ways of knowing embedded within all traditions 
(cottingham, 1988; matson, 2000). since at least the 17th century, con-
text-independent knowledge has been separated from and preferred over 
context-dependent ways of knowing (newbigin, 1995; Van Belle, 2005). 
and, because modern science appears to be so well sanitized of context-
dependent knowledge, many seem to render it more true or legitimate 
than other ways of knowing (newbigin, 1995). Therefore, it is considered 
authoritative and is privileged over the extra-scientific conclusions of 
many traditions (this position is typically called scientism). science has 
become venerated as a result of the cartesian program, whereas theism 
has been categorically dismissed for its context-dependent, tradition-
based ways of knowing. 
a second fundamental way that descartes influenced psychological 
science is apparent in its justifications for what counts as knowledge 
(murphy, 1997). These justifications stem from his presumption that 
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structures of knowledge should be built in a gradual, floor-by-floor manner 
on established foundations (cottingham, 1988; matson, 2000). The carte-
sian program also tends to distrust any claims that do not follow a linear, 
bottom-up approach to knowing; alternative approaches are considered 
less valid (murphy, 1997). Psychological scientists generally embrace this 
theory of knowledge (called epistemological foundationalism). in doing so, 
they justify their research activities as extensions or clarifications of those 
things already known though the methods of science, and they assume 
that their scientific conclusions will justify future research activities. how-
ever, many theistic traditions tend to make claims that are not knowable 
in this way, which inclines some psychological scientists to discredit 
them completely. descartes’ epistemological foundationalism has forever 
shaped scientific knowing and served as an impetus for excluding the 
extra-scientific approaches to knowing used by many theistic traditions.
And all was light. newton (e.g., 1687/1999), with his remarkable accom-
plishments in physics, also shaped the field of psychological science in 
at least two important ways (newbigin, 1995). first, he provided a math-
ematical account of complex phenomena in the natural world using more 
basic units of matter (feingold, 2004; murphy, 1997). his calculations of 
mass and force explained “everything from the movement of the stars to 
the fall of an apple” and seemed to reveal a model of reality independent 
of faith commitments (newbigin, 1995, p. 29). in other words, the newto-
nian program not only categorized the world into more basic elements 
(a position on reality called atomism), it also made sense of more complex 
phenomena using only those basic elements (reductionism: murphy, 1997; 
Van Belle, 2005). it did so without a theistic explanation of reality; the 
universe seemed to make sense independent of a divine being (newbigin, 
1995). The impact of this shift cannot be underestimated for psychological 
science. it has resulted in the rejection of theistic truth claims that are not 
reductionist; explanations of reality now must be purged of a divine being 
(Van Belle, 2005). 
The apparent success of newton’s atomist-reductionist model has 
resulted in a second, though related, influence over psychological science. 
it follows from his presumption that all phenomena can and should be 
explained by reference to physical matter, motion, and natural laws (Van 
Belle, 2005). The newtonian program ascribes to a model of reality that 
can be manipulated to produce any desired effect, like a grand machine, 
and which science seems to promise the means to control (murphy, 1997; 
Van Belle, 2005). This position on reality is called mechanical materialism. 
for the field of psychological science, this serves as a primary working 
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premise in the pursuit of knowledge (murphy, 1997), making claims about 
causation in the material world privileged over alternative explanations of 
reality. since theists tend to hold extra-scientific explanations of reality, 
which are unknowable through the methods of science, they are rejected 
under the newtonian program. many psychological scientists refuse to 
accept any theistic claims about reality that are not knowable through 
the methods of science.
Appraisals of Modern Science
it seems the cartesian program has succeeded in convincing many psy-
chological scientists that they can know in context-independent, tradi-
tion-free ways. however, many postmodern philosophers (e.g., foucault, 
1972; Kuhn, 1996; lakatos, 1981) have argued that science is itself a con-
text-dependent paradigm—a tradition. for instance, Polanyi (1974) sug-
gested that becoming a scientist involves apprenticeship to a tradition 
of knowledge to acquire the necessary skills and worldviews to carry out 
future scientific endeavors (see also newbigin, 1995). This is, in no small 
way, a significant objective of graduate training as a psychological scien-
tist. students learn to indwell the scientific tradition and rely on particu-
lar methodologies and landmark studies to continue the acquisition of 
knowledge (Polanyi, 1974). it seems that psychological science is a tradi-
tion and has context-dependent ways of knowing. This is not necessarily 
a bad thing, but it does deserve some consideration insofar as it serves as 
a major premise for the exclusion of theistic traditions from psychological 
science. 
not only is science a tradition, it is many traditions. The demarcation 
problem in the philosophy of science (e.g., feyerabend, 2010; lakatos, 
1981) has highlighted that there do not seem to be very clear distinctions 
between ways of knowing that are scientific, pseudo-scientific, and non-
scientific. although they share some basic assumptions (e.g., falsifiability, 
reproducibility), the various disciplines of science employ vastly different 
methods to know about reality. Perhaps the methodological differences 
within the natural sciences are as great as those between the natural and 
social sciences. further, the gap between astronomy and biology is at least 
as wide as that between psychological science and theism. science is not a 
monolithic unit of an accepted method, but rather it is a collection of vari-
ous scientific traditions (midgley, 2004, 2011). among other things, post-
modernity has concluded that descartes’ search for a single foundation of 
context-independent, tradition-free knowledge has been unsuccessful. 
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regarding newton’s atomist-reductionist model of reality, postmodern-
ists would have us consider that the assumptions of science are “not based 
on particular scientific evidence” and are themselves extra-scientific in 
essence (midgley, 2011, p. xiv). in other words, atomism, reductionism, 
mechanical materialism, epistemological foundationalism, and scientism 
are each philosophical conclusions; they cannot be known through the 
methods of science (midgley, 2004, 2011). all of science, including psycho-
logical science, is rife with extra-scientific claims about reality.
Insufficient Grounds for Exclusion
Theism relies on tradition-based, context-dependent ways of knowing 
and makes extra-scientific conclusions about reality. But so does psy-
chological science. This is not an attempt to discredit scientific knowing; 
rather, it is an attempt to defend psychological science from a dangerous 
misconception. Psychological scientists are able to do good work because 
of their philosophical assumptions which are unavoidably context-depen-
dent, tradition-based, and extra-scientific (cf. hayes, strosahl, & Wilson, 
1999). furthermore, choosing to reject claims that are not tradition-free, 
context-independent, and scientific would both exclude theism from psy-
chological science and fundamentally undermine the scientific endeavor. 
it would cut off the nose to spite the face. although psychological science 
and theism utilize different methods to know about reality, it does not 
necessarily follow that they are completely incompatible or irreconcilable. 
it also does not follow that theism should be excluded from psychological 
science because it relies on tradition-based, context-dependent ways of 
knowing and makes extra-scientific conclusions about reality. That con-
clusion is a bias of scientism, and it ignores many thoughtful appraisals 
of the modern scientific endeavor. Taken together, these common objec-
tions yield insufficient grounds for the exclusion of theism from psycho-
logical science.
The argument for including Theism
a divine being may or may not exist. such a determination is beyond 
the realm of science; it is extra-scientific. regardless, theism ought to be 
considered in behavioral science for various reasons. We suggest three: 
relevance, ethics, and utility, though more could certainly be offered.
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Relevance
social scientists study human experience which has been profoundly 
shaped by religious values and beliefs throughout history. if psychological 
science and the clinical methods that emerge from psychological science 
are to remain relevant to the questions and struggles of everyday living, 
then religious faith must be considered. Though religion has become less 
important to United states residents over the past 15 years, the decline is 
not as remarkable as the persistently high rates of faith. in 2010, 80% still 
reported religion to be very important or fairly important to them, down 
7% from 1992. almost two-thirds (61%) belonged to a church or synagogue 
and 39% had attended services in the past seven days (gallup, 2011). 
Psychologists and those studying psychology tend to be less religious 
than the general population, which may give them a skewed view of the 
religiousness of others. Table 1 shows the importance of religion to various 
groups, with data coming from various studies that the authors have been 
involved with in recent years. among a large group of university students 
(n = 1800), 76.1% reported their religion is very or fairly important to them, 
a number quite consistent with the gallup poll results just described. in 
contrast, only 20.7% of american Psychological association (aPa) lead-
ers (divisional presidents and representatives on aPa council) described 
their religion to be very or fairly important. rates among other psychology 
groups vary, but all are substantially lower than the general public: 35.5% 
of doctoral students, 40.7% psychology interns, 52.5% of doctoral faculty, 
23.1% of doctoral program directors of clinical Training (dcT), and 29.0% 
of internship dcTs reported religion to be very or fairly important to them 
(Vogel, 2011).
While these numbers reflect disparity between psychologists and the 
general public, it is important to note that psychologists, and those in 
training, are not utterly non-religious. for example, one-third of doctoral 
students in psychology and over half of their faculty reported religion to 
be personally important. over 15 years ago shafrankse (1996) concluded, 
“it appears that psychologists may be more similar than dissimilar to the 
general population in their religious views and faith commitments” (p. 160). 
The same holds true today, suggesting that theistic values are important 
to consider insofar as they are relevant to how many psychologists and 
psychologists-in-training understand life and even more pertinent to 
those outside the field of psychology.
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Ethics
The inclusion of theism in psychological science is not only a matter of rel-
evance but also a matter of ethics. Psychologists in the aPa are supported 
(if not mandated) by the Ethics Code (aPa, 2002) to increase scientific 
knowledge related to the beliefs, experiences, and values of theistic indi-
viduals. This is not a new development, as they have been encouraged to 
do so for almost two decades (see aPa, 1992). including theistic religion in 
psychological science satisfies an established ethic to demonstrate respect 
for worldview considerations that are important to most americans. 
There are also reasons to believe the ethical impetus for considering 
theistic religion within psychological science is growing. as the sociopo-
litical milieu of the Us continues to change, the value of multicultural 
diversity becomes ever more important (aPa, 2003). This is as much the 
case for theistic religion as it is for any other dimension of diversity, such 
as ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender. The aPa has responded at an 
organizational level to the ethic for multicultural sensitivity by launching 
The Task force on enhancing diversity in the aPa, hiring a chief diver-
sity officer, and promoting psychological science to diverse populations 
(e.g., anderson, 2008). Theistic religion, as a relevant dimension of multi-
cultural diversity, is ethically important in the aPa (e.g., aPa, 2003, 2008) 
and warrants consideration in psychological science. 
Table 1. Importance of Religion among Various Groups
group N Mean Std Dev
Undergraduate students 1800 4.0 1.1
doctoral psychology students 110 2.7 1.4
Predoctoral psychology interns 59 3.0 1.3
doctoral faculty 40 3.3 1.4
doctoral dcTs 26 2.7 1.3
internship dcTs 38 2.8 1.1
aPa leaders 63 2.3 1.2
Notes: all participants answered the question, “how important is your religion to you?” 
on a 5-point likert-type scale ranging from 1, “Not at all important, I have no religion” to 5, 
“Very important, it is the center of my life.” data were collected as parts of different studies. 
The undergraduate student data came from louwerse, mcminn, mcminn, & aten (2008). 
data regarding aPa leaders came from mcminn, hathaway, Woods, and snow (2009). all 
other data are from Vogel (2011). dcT = director of clinical Training. The overall difference 
between groups is statistically significant, F(6, 2129)=60.44, p < .001. Post hoc comparisons 
using scheffe tests reveal differences (p < .05) between undergraduate students and all 
other groups and also between aPa leaders and doctoral faculty.
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as our understanding of religion continues to develop, we become 
increasingly aware of the interconnections between theism and other 
dimensions of diversity (cf. constantine, 1999). To be sure, considering 
theistic religion is helpful to better understand the racial and cultural 
identities of most, if not all, americans (cross, 1995; harry, 1992; leong, 
Wagner, & Tata, 1995; smart & smart, 1992; see Vogel, 2011). 
Utility
in years past, it was not uncommon to find psychologists trumpeting 
the deleterious effects of theistic belief (e.g., ellis, 1962, 1971, 1980, 1983; 
Walls, 1980), but scientific results showing various health benefits associ-
ated with religious and spiritual beliefs demanded a change (e.g., Koenig, 
mccullough, & larson, 2001). The flagship journal of the aPa, American 
Psychologist, published a special section on health and religion less than 
a decade ago (hill & Pargament, 2003; miller & Thoresen, 2003; Powell, 
shahabi, & Thoresen, 2003; seeman, dubin, & seeman, 2003). Though not 
every religious variable is positively associated with increased health, the 
beneficial nature of various religious and spiritual activities and beliefs is 
quite striking. 
mcminn, snow, and orton (in press) suggested several ways that reli-
gion, including theistic religion, may help promote health. first, religion 
provides a sense of meaning, which can be especially important dur-
ing difficult seasons of life (slattery & Park, 2011). The meaning derived 
through theistic beliefs may also promote altruistic and pro-social behav-
iors, which have been shown to help mental health (Post, 2005; schwartz, 
meisenhelder, ma, & reed, 2002). second, theists often belong to faith 
communities that provide social support. shared beliefs and rituals pro-
vide hope and healing during normal life stressors and transitions (see 
Pargament, 1997). Third, religious communities offer resources and help 
amidst times of struggle and trouble. clergy often provide counsel and 
support for parishioners, and many clergy are open to collaborating with 
psychologists to help others in times of need (edwards, lim, mcminn, & 
dominguez, 1999; mcminn, aikins, & lish, 2003).
clinicians have also become increasingly open to considering religion 
and spirituality, both as a matter of human diversity and as a protective 
factor in mental and physical health (aten & leach, 2009; aten, mcminn, 
& Worthington, 2011; miller & delaney, 2005; Pargament, 2007; richards & 
Bergin, 2005; sperry & shafranske, 2005). rather than trying to disabuse 
clients of their faulty religious beliefs, as some clinicians once promoted 
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(e.g., Walls, 1980), today’s clinical psychologist is mandated both by ethics 
and research to be respectful of clients’ theistic beliefs.
conclusion
more than a century has passed since James (1902/1961) first encouraged 
psychologists to explore the religious experience. some (e.g., allport, 1961; 
Koenig, mccullough, & larson, 2001; Plante, 2009; shafranske, 1996) have 
taken this task seriously, whereas others (e.g., ellis, 1962, 1971, 1980, 1983; 
Walls, 1980) seem to have been reluctant to include theism in psychology. 
We believe the philosophical assumptions of modern science have been 
used to justify the usual arguments for excluding theistic religion from 
psychology. however, the appraisals of postmodernity (e.g., feyerabend, 
2010; lakatos, 1981) have challenged many core assumptions of the sci-
entific endeavor and called attention to its context-dependent, tradition-
based ways of knowing. This does not invalidate psychological science, 
which has immensely benefited humanity, but rather defends it from the 
misconception that it is without assumptions that are shared within its 
particular community. furthermore, we contend that the relevance, ethi-
cal support from the aPa, and utility of theistic religion are among the 
many reasons to include it in psychological science. We hope the split 
between science and religion over the 20th century will be corrected by a 
rapprochement during the 21st century. 
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